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Keeping It Real: Judicial Review of Asylum
Credibility Determinations in the Eleventh
Circuit After the REAL ID Act
TANIA GALLONI*
Judicial review in the circuit courts has been described as "the first
line of defense against mistaken or biased immigration judge deci-
sions."' In the asylum context-where individuals seek protection in
the United States based on a well-founded fear of persecution in their
home country-the stakes are particularly high. After all, "errors of
adjudication can deliver [asylum seekers] into the hands of their perse-
cutors."2 When they arrive in the United States, however, many asylum
seekers have fled urgent circumstances with "nothing but the shirts on
their backs,"3 and thus have nothing but their own testimony to establish
the truth of their claims. Judicial review of adverse credibility determi-
nations in the asylum context is therefore of paramount importance.
The REAL ID Act of 2005' created new statutory provisions gov-
erning immigration judges' credibility determinations and requests for
corroborating evidence in adjudicating claims for asylum and withhold-
ing of removal. Although the REAL ID Act applies to all claims filed
after May 11, 2005, the Eleventh Circuit has only recently begun to
apply the new provisions as denials of asylum reach the court after ini-
tial determinations by immigration judges and administrative review by
the Board of Immigration Appeals. This article addresses the scope and
* Tania Galloni is the Adrienne Arsht Human Rights Fellow at the Florida Immigrant
Advocacy Center ("FIAC"), where she focuses on federal court litigation. Before joining FIAC,
Ms. Galloni was law clerk to the Honorable Rosemary Barkett, U.S. Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; law clerk to the Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks,
U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida; and Arthur Liman Public Interest Fellow
and attorney with the Migrant Farmworker Justice Project of Florida Legal Services.
1. Lindsey R. Vaala, Note, Bias on the Bench: Raising the Bar for U.S. Immigration Judges
To Ensure Equality for Asylum Seekers, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1024 (2007).
2. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 388 (2007).
3. Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 2005).
4. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 & 49 U.S.C.). The REAL ID Act was passed as part of the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief,
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. Among other things, the law enacted national standards
for driver's licenses and other forms of personal identification. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-13, div. B, §§ 201-07, 119 Stat. 231, 311-16 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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importance of judicial review of adverse credibility determinations in
the Eleventh Circuit, now under the REAL ID framework. Part I
describes the critical role courts of appeal play in reviewing adverse
credibility determinations, particularly in light of questions that have
emerged regarding the quality of immigration judging and the severely
curtailed administrative appellate review process. Part II addresses the
centrality of credibility determinations in asylum law, and their height-
ened susceptibility to error based on issues of language, culture, and
experience. Part III discusses the Eleventh Circuit's exceptionally nar-
row view of its role in reviewing credibility determinations, as the only
circuit court never to have reversed an adverse credibility finding in a
published opinion while ostensibly applying the same standards of
review as other courts. Part IV.A. describes the REAL ID Act's "total-
ity of the circumstances" test for credibility determinations and raises
the interpretive questions the court will be called on to address as it
begins to apply the new provision. Part IV.B. briefly describes the
court's recent jurisprudence on the REAL ID Act's provision related to
corroboration. The article concludes that, even with a limited standard
of review both pre- and post-REAL ID, the court has an obligation to
rigorously scrutinize adverse credibility determinations- to ensure that
asylum seekers with a well-founded fear of persecution are afforded the
protections this country offers under the law. The REAL ID Act's
"totality of the circumstances" test provides the court with an opportu-
nity to do just that.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States has a long-standing humanitarian commitment to
providing refuge to those who have a well-founded fear of persecution
in their country of origin. Forty years ago, the United States ratified the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,5 which
incorporated most of the provisions of the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 6 In 1980, Congress passed the Refu-
gee Act,7 creating statutory mechanisms for asylum seekers to avail
themselves of this country's protections.8 Among other things, the Ref-
5. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
6. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
7. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 20, 22, 42 & 50 U.S.C.).
8. The Refugee Act provides three categories of humanitarian relief to those with a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground. First, "asylum" is available to any
alien who is physically present in or arrives in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2000).
The applicant may establish eligibility for asylum if he shows that he has suffered past persecution
or has a "well-founded fear of future persecution." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2008). To be eligible
1038 [Vol. 62:1037
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ugee Act adopted the Convention's definition of a refugee as someone
with a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."9
The U.S. courts of appeals play an integral role in this country's
commitment to the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. Appli-
cants whose claims are initially denied by an immigration judge (or
"IJ")" may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), an
administrative appellate body." If the appeal is denied, federal law pro-
vides for judicial review by the U.S. court of appeals in which the immi-
gration judge completed the proceedings. 2 For asylum seekers in
Florida, Georgia, and Alabama, then, a petition for review in the Elev-
enth Circuit is the first (and likely only) opportunity for judicial review
of their claims.' 3 Judicial review is thus a vital safeguard both for the
individual asylum seeker, for whom the denial of asylum may have been
for asylum, the applicant need only show a "reasonable possibility" that he or she will be
persecuted if returned to the country of origin. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,440 (1987)
(quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984)).
Second, "withholding of removal" prevents the removal (or deportation) of an individual
where it is "more likely than not" that the applicant will suffer persecution if returned to his or her
country of origin. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000); Delgado v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d
855, 861 (11 th Cir. 2007); Niftaliev v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (11 th Cir. 2007).
While the grant of asylum is discretionary under 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal is
mandatory where eligibility is established subject to limited exceptions. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
Finally, "refugee" status is available to a limited number of individuals outside the United
States who have a well-founded fear of persecution and are of special humanitarian concern to the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2000).
This article focuses on asylum and withholding of removal, for which the legal standards
(other than the requisite likelihood of persecution to establish eligibility) are identical. It does not
address the relief available under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), which prohibits the
United States from removing anyone to a country where he or she will likely be tortured without
regard to a protected ground. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11 th Cir.
2007) (reviewing denial of CAT claim).
9. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). In 1996, Congress extended the definition of
"political opinion" for purposes of asylum law to include resisting or opposing coercive
population control policies such as forced abortion or sterilization, subject to numerical
limitations. See id.
10. Individuals who are present (or arriving) in the United States may apply for asylum either
"affirmatively" (if they are not in removal proceedings) or "defensively" (if they are already in
removal proceedings). An affirmative application is first heard in a nonadversarial setting by an
asylum officer. If the asylum officer does not grant relief, he or she will refer the case to an
immigration judge. A defensive application is heard in the first instance by an immigration judge.
II. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2008).
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2000). Before 1996, federal district courts heard appeals from
BIA decisions in "exclusion" proceedings, but that is no longer the case. See Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-
546, -612 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § l105a).
13. Immigration judges and members of the BIA are not part of the Judiciary, but rather
employees of the Executive Branch. They fall under the Executive Office for Immigration
Review ("EOIR") within the U.S. Department of Justice. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a).
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in error, and for the United States, which has committed to protect asy-
lum seekers and refugees from persecution. Judicial review is supposed
to guarantee that each decision to grant or deny asylum is lawful and
consistent with this commitment.
In recent years, some circuit courts have sharply criticized the per-
formance of immigration judges in particular cases. In Benslimane v.
Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit observed that in one year, different panels
of that court had reversed "a staggering 40 percent" of the petitions for
review resolved on the merits, and that "the adjudication of these cases
at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of
legal justice.' 4 In Wang v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit
lamented that "time and time again" it had admonished immigration
judges for their conduct in the courtroom. 5 The court then criticized the
IJ in that case for "attack[ing] Wang's moral character rather than con-
duct[ing] a fair and impartial inquiry into his asylum claims," observing
that the "tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ
seem more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court
proceeding."' 6  In Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit
rejected an IJ's adverse credibility determination that "was skewed by
prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and conjecture." '17
A 2006 report by Syracuse University's Transaction Records
Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC") revealed dramatic disparities in asy-
lum grant rates even among judges in the same city hearing claims from
the same population of applicants, all of whom were represented by
counsel. 18
The immigration judges within the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction
were no exception."' For the period from 2000 to 2005, Miami immi-
gration judge Mahlon F. Hanson's denial rate was the highest in the
14. 430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005).
15. 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
16. Id. at 269.
17. 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005).
18. See TRAC Immigration, Immigration Judges, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/l60/
(last visited May 19, 2008). Although some disparities observed in the study may have been
attributable to the country of origin of applicants, the country of origin cannot explain disparities
among judges in the same city who hear claims from the same pool of applicants.
19. The study analyzed the performance of all immigration judges who heard more than 100
claims during the relevant time period. Within the Eleventh Circuit, this included twenty-five
immigration judges in Miami (most of whom heard more than 1,000 claims each); three
immigration judges in Orlando (between 600 to 1,500 claims each); two immigration judges in
Atlanta (roughly 300 to 500 claims each); and one immigration judge in Bradenton (107 claims).
TRAC Immigration, Asylum Denial Rates by Immigration Judge: FY 2000-FY 2005, http://
trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/include/judge_0005_name-r.html (last visited May 19,
2008).
1040 [Vol. 62:1037
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country, at 96.7% of all cases before him. 20 By contrast, Miami immi-
gration judge Sandra S. Coleman denied only 22.3% of the claims
before her during the same time period.2' The twenty-three other immi-
gration judges in Miami fell somewhere in between.22 In Orlando,
denial rates among the three immigration judges there varied more than
fifteen percentage points, ranging from 51.6% to 35.8%.23 The two
immigration judges in Atlanta were more consistent, with William A.
Cassidy denying 87% of asylum claims, and G. Mackenzie Rast denying
82.2%.24 The sole immigration judge in Bradenton, R. Kevin McHugh,
denied 89.7% of the claims he heard.25
TRAC's codirector, David Burnham, concluded that the study's
"findings seemed to call into question the government's commitment to
providing a uniform application of the nation's immigration laws in all
cases." 26 The report stated that its "case-by-case analysis 'appears to
document long-standing, widespread, and systematic weaknesses in both
the operation and management of the court."' 27  Some attributed these
problems with the system to immigration judges being "seriously over-
worked," hearing between ten to fifteen cases a day, and having "little
time to provide a fair hearing."28 Former Orlando immigration judge
Roberto Moreno "said there also is a 'disparity of professional stan-
20. Id.
21. Id. Nationally, the median denial rate (with half of judges falling above and half falling
below) was 65%. TRAC Immigration, supra note 18.
22. Beginning with the highest denial rates first, and in descending order, the remaining
immigration judges in Miami had the following denial rates: Neale Foster (94.6%); Keith C.
Williams (88.7%); Rex J. Ford (88.5%); Kevin G. Bradley (88%); Kenneth S. Hurewitz (87.9%);
J. Daniel Dowell (87.6%); Denise A. Marks Lane (86.1%); Teofilo Chapa (85.6%); Ronald G.
Sonom (82.1%); Scott G. Alexander (81%); H. Lloyd King Jr. (80.9%); Nancy R. McCormack
(79.8%); Charles J. Sanders (78.7%); Bruce W. Solow (78.2%); Pedro A. Miranda (77.4%); Ira
Sandron (72.9%); Stephen E. Mander (71.2%); Elisa M. Sukkar (70.4%); Lilliana Torreh-Bayouth
(70.2%); Seymour R. Kleinfeld (70%); Michael C. Horn (64.6%); Anthony J. Randall (54.2%);
and Denise N. Slavin (39.6%). TRAC Immigration, Asylum Denial Rates by Immigration Judge,
supra note 19. That places the median denial rate in Miami at around 80%.
23. Rafael B. Ortiz-Segura (51.6% of 1,487 claims); Roberto Moreno (46% of 689 claims);
and Renetta Smith (35.8% of 601 claims). Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Rachel L. Swans, Study Finds Disparities in Judges' Asylum Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2006, at AI5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. Eunice Moscoso, Study: Asylum Requests Judged Inconsistently, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
July 31, 2006, at 3A (quoting TRAC Report). Lindsey R. Vaala observes that "TRAC's findings
confirmed what many federal jurists, asylum lawyers, and system observers already suspected:
immigration decisions under the EOIR and the BIA vary widely and arbitrarily." Vaala, supra
note 1, at 1023.
28. Elaine Silvestrini, U.S. Asylum Cases Vary by Judge, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 8, 2006, at I
(quoting Thomas M. Davies, Jr., former director of the Center for Latin American Studies at San
Diego State University). In 2006, Judge John M. Walker, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the impact
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dards' among judges, who come from different professional back-
grounds. 29 Whatever the cause, the glaringly disparate results for
similar applicant pools highlight the need for rigorous appellate review
to correct errors and ensure consistency.
However, for the past several years, administrative appellate review
of asylum claims has been sharply curtailed. In 2002, Attorney General
John Ashcroft "streamlined" the BIA review process by requiring
review by a single BIA member in most cases rather than the three-
member panel employed before, and directing that most affirmances be
rendered by one-sentence summary orders.3 ° Ashcroft's reforms "dra-
matically expanded" summary review in the BIA. 31 At the same time,
Ashcroft also reduced the size of the BIA by half, from twenty-three to
eleven members.32
Several observers have called into question the quality of adminis-
trative appellate review that has resulted from these reforms. 33 In Febru-
of these reforms on the judiciary. Chief Judge Walker began by lamenting the lack of resources
for the country's immigration judges:
The 215 Immigration Judges are required to cope with filings of over 300,000 cases
a year. With only 215 Judges, a single Judge has to dispose of 1,400 cases a year or
nearly twenty-seven cases a week, or more than five each business day, simply to
stay abreast of his docket. I fail to see how Immigration Judges can be expected to
make thorough and competent findings of fact and conclusions of law under these
circumstances. This is especially true given the unique nature of immigration
hearings. Aliens frequently do not speak English, so the Immigration Judge must
work with a translator, and the Immigration Judge normally must go over particular
testimony several times before he can be confident that he is getting an accurate
answer from the alien. Hearings, particularly in asylum cases, are highly fact
intensive and depend upon the presentation and consideration of numerous details
and documents to determine issues of credibility and to reach factual conclusions.
This can take no small amount of time depending on the nature of the alien's
testimony.
Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit)
[hereinafter Immigration Litigation Reduction], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id= 1845&witid=5214.
29. Silvestrini, supra note 28 (quoting Moreno); see also Vaala, supra note 1, at 1040-41
(noting that although applicants for the position of immigration judge must be lawyers with
relevant experience, they are not required to demonstrate a knowledge of immigration laws and
procedures in order to be hired).
30. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS To IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 15-16 (2003), http://www.
dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA-8mgPDF.pdf; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2008);
Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2003) (describing summary
affirmance procedure in context of due process challenge).
31. Susan Burkhardt, The Contours of Conformity: Behavioral Decision Theory and the
Pitfalls of the 2002 Reforms of Immigration Procedures, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 47 (2004).
32. See id. at 51.
33. See John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration
1042
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ary 2005 the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom issued a report on the effect of Ashcroft's changes on asylum
seekers who were detained upon arrival in the United States.34 Accord-
ing to the Commission, the BIA had sustained 23% of asylum appeals in
such cases in 2001.1 5 After the 2002 changes were implemented, how-
ever, that number dropped to an average of 3%.36 On April 3, 2006,
Judge John M. Walker, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about
the reforms. Judge Walker estimated that under the single-member
review system, each BIA member must decide 4,000 cases a year, or
eighty per week, in order to keep up with the rate of filings.37 Judge
Walker commented that because of these pressures, the BIA "rarely
seems to adjudicate the outstanding legal issues in a case" and is unable
to "properly play its role of providing uniform national rules of law in
these cases."38 Thus, "[t]he opportunity for meaningful administrative
review has deteriorated to the point where the circuit courts now
represent the first line of defense against mistaken or biased immigration
judge decisions."39 Given that certiorari review in the U.S. Supreme
Court is rarely granted, the U.S. courts of appeals may provide the only
meaningful review the overwhelming majority of appellants will
40
receive.
As a result of the BIA reforms, the workload of the U.S. courts of
appeals has increased dramatically. 4' In 2005, Judge Julia Gibbons of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit testified in a Congres-
sional committee hearing that, nationally, immigration appeals had
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for
Review, 20 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 5 (2005) ("Many observers, including a commission of the
American Bar Association, suggest that the appeal rate has increased, at least in part, because
there has been a qualitative change in the BIA's decision-making. They argue that single Board
members are bound to make more errors than three-member panels, especially when they are
allowed to summarily affirm Immigration Judge (IJ) decisions.").
34. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, STUDY ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED
REMOVAL (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/images/stories/pdf/asylum-seekers/ERS-RptVolIl.pdf.
35. Id. at 413-14.
36. Id.
37. Immigration Litigation Reduction, supra note 28.
38. Id.
39. Vaala, supra note 1, at 1024 ("The exponential increase in immigration cases has not
gone unnoticed by federal judiciary members, several of whom have repeatedly expressed
frustration and disappointment over the immigration system's current state.").
40. In most cases, this means reviewing the immigration judge's decision directly, which is
typically rendered as an oral decision from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing.
41. See Vaala, supra note 1, at 1021 ("Although the BIA changes strove to streamline the
process, [the reforms] backfired, creating more work at the federal appellate level."); see also
Palmer et al., supra note 33, at 3; John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration
Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 14
(2006).
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"risen from 1,642 cases in 2001 to 11,366 cases in 2004 (an increase of
592%). "142 In 2001, appeals of BIA decisions comprised just 3% of
appeals filed in federal circuit courts. 3 By the end of 2007, they consti-
tuted 16% of all federal appeals.44 In the Eleventh Circuit, BIA appeals
jumped from 1% to 8% of the court's workload during that same time.45
It is against this backdrop that the Eleventh Circuit will increas-
ingly be tasked with reviewing the denial of asylum based on adverse
credibility determinations under the standards announced in the REAL
ID Act. Given the strain on court resources, the challenge becomes
ensuring that each appeal of an adverse credibility determination
receives the individualized scrutiny that it deserves and that the law
requires. After all, the stakes could not be higher. As the Second Cir-
cuit observed in Ming Shi Xue v. Board of Immigration Appeals:
Asylum petitions of aliens seeking refuge from alleged persecution
are among the hardest cases faced by our courts. They are not games.
And, despite their volume, these suits are not to be disposed of
improvidently, or without the care and judicial attention-by immi-
gration judges, in the first instance, and by federal judges, on
appeal-to which all litigants are entitled. We should not forget,
after all, what is at stake. For each time we wrongly deny a meritori-
ous asylum application, concluding that an immigrant's story is
fabricated when, in fact, it is real, we risk condemning an individual
to persecution. Whether the danger is of religious discrimination,
extrajudicial punishment, forced abortion or involuntary sterilization,
physical torture or banishment, we must always remember the toll
42. Comm. on the Budget of the Judicial Conf. of the United States: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, District
of Columbia and Independent Agencies of the Comm. on Appropriations of the United States H.R.,
109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Hon. Julia S. Gibbons, Chair, Comm. on the Budget of the
Judicial Conf. of the United States), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/judge
gibbons041505.pdf.
43. Eleanor Acer & Anwen Hughes, The Post-September 11 Asylum System, LITIGATION,
Summer 2006, at 43.
44. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS-SOURCES OF
APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2003 THROUGH 2007 (2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus
2007/appendices/BO3SepO7.pdf. The Second and Ninth Circuits had by far the largest percentage
of BIA appeals, with 34% of their appeals arising out of BIA decisions. Id. The Third Circuit
came close to the national average, with 15% of its appeals arising out of BIA decisions. The
remaining circuits fell below the national average, with between 3% and 11% of all appeals
arising out of BIA decisions: First Circuit (11%); Eleventh Circuit (8%); Fifth Circuit (6%); Sixth
Circuit (6%); Fourth Circuit (5%); Seventh Circuit (5%); Eighth Circuit (4%); and Tenth Circuit
(3%). Id.
45. Id.; see also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS-
SOURCES OF APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT, DURING THE 12-
MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1998 THROUGH 2002 (2002), http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2002/appendices/b03sep02.pdf.
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that is paid if and when we err. 4 6
II. THE CENTRALITY OF CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS TO
ASYLUM CLAIMS
As mentioned earlier, credibility determinations are central to an
immigration judge's adjudication of an asylum claim. The applicant's
testimony has been described as "the critical core of the asylum determi-
nation," because refugees and asylum seekers "generally are unable to
produce external corroborative evidence. 47 Indeed, as one court has
observed:
Many asylum applicants flee their home countries under circum-
stances of great urgency. Some are literally running for their lives
and have to abandon their families, friends, jobs, and material posses-
sions without a word of explanation. They often have nothing but the
shirts on their backs when they arrive in this country. To expect
these individuals to stop and collect dossiers of paperwork before
fleeing is both unrealistic and strikingly insensitive to the harrowing
conditions they face.48
Recognizing these challenges, U.S. regulations provide that "[t]he
testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the
burden of proof without corroboration."49 By the same token, "an
adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to support the
denial of an asylum application."50
Yet many factors inherent in the asylum process also render these
determinations particularly susceptible to error. Accurate credibility
determinations must overcome differences in cultural modes of expres-
sion (such as whether it is appropriate to make eye contact with author-
ity figures), applicants' limited access to competent legal counsel, and
apparent inconsistencies or contradictions due to factors not bearing on
credibility (such as language barriers, cultural norms affecting linear
thought or the recall of specific dates, and the effects of post-traumatic
46. 439 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted).
47. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 150 (3d ed. 1999).
48. Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2005).
49. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b) (2008); see also Niftaliev v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 504 F.3d
1211, 1217 (11 th Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of asylum based on lack of corroborative evidence
where applicant's credible and specific testimony was sufficient for applicant to show past
persecution, noting "[w]e are also troubled by the notion of condemning the petitioner for failing
to obtain some sort of documentation from the same government that persecuted and imprisoned
him, concerning incidents that occurred approximately ten years ago"); Forgue v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that credible testimony of an applicant "is
alone sufficient" to establish eligibility for asylum); D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att'y Gen, 388 F.3d 814,
818-19 (1Ilth Cir. 2004).
50. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287 (citing Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc) ("An alien's credibility, by itself, may satisfy his burden, or doom his claim.")).
2008] 1045
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stress). For example, in Mwembie v. Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit
expressed concern over an IJ's "incorrect and irrational assumptions
about human behavior and especially the behavior of people from for-
eign cultures, such as her assumptions about a victim's ability to remem-
ber phone numbers, about all aliens' behavior in saying good-bye to
their families before fleeing, or about the 'incomprehensible' [and thus
'implausible'] brutality of the persecutors."'" Similarly, in Iao v. Gon-
zales, the Seventh Circuit cautioned against basing credibility determi-
nations on judgments about demeanor that may reflect more about the
witness's culture than his or her reliability.5" Specifically, in the case of
a Chinese applicant, the court observed that "[b]ehaviors that in our cul-
ture are considered evidence of unreliability, such as refusing to look a
person in the eyes when he is talking to you, are in Asian cultures a sign
of respect."53 In Castajieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, the First Circuit sitting
en banc reversed an adverse credibility determination where the record
showed that perceived inconsistencies or evasiveness in the applicant's
testimony were attributable to poor translation. 4 In addition, the adver-
sarial setting of an immigration court hearing can be intimidating and
confusing to the asylum seeker, given that "most refugees have lived
experiences in their country of origin which give them good reason to
distrust persons in authority. '5 5 These factors can "adversely affect the
adjudicator's ability to interpret accurately behavioral signals or to eval-
uate evidentiary discrepancies. 56 Not surprisingly, proper credibility
determinations have been described as "the most difficult and elusive
aspect of asylum adjudication. 57
Although, as a matter of law, appellate bodies properly accord con-
siderable deference to an immigration judge's credibility findings,58 the
centrality of this determination in the asylum context-coupled with the
vast potential for error and the enormous consequences of an erroneous
determination-call for meaningful judicial review. This is not a radical
proposition. Governing law provides for judicial review of adverse
credibility determinations in asylum cases. 59 That review must therefore
have meaning.
51. 443 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2006).
52. 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2005).
53. Id.
54. 488 F.3d 17, 26-30 (lst Cir. 2007) (en banc).
55. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 84 (1991).
56. ANKER, supra note 47, at 153 (quoting Joanna Ruppel, The Need for a Benefit of the
Doubt Standard in Credibility Evaluation of Asylum Applicants, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1,
12 (1991-1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 152 n.316 (quoting Ruppel, supra note 56, at 39).
58. See, e.g., D-Muhumed v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 818-19 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
59. See id.
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II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RECORD-AN EXCEPTIONALLY
NARROW VIEW
Notwithstanding the centrality of proper credibility assessments to
the adjudication of asylum claims, the Eleventh Circuit has long taken
an exceptionally narrow view of its role in reviewing these determina-
tions, even when ostensibly applying the same standards as other courts
of appeals.
Like other courts of appeals, the Eleventh Circuit reviews credibil-
ity determinations under the "substantial evidence" test,6" which is "def-
erential" and does not allow "'re-weigh[ing] the evidence' from
scratch."'" As with other questions of fact, a credibility determination
"may not be overturned unless the record compels it."62
In addition, although the Eleventh Circuit never expressly adopted
the "heart of the claim" test articulated by other courts before the REAL
ID Act 63-the principle that minor inconsistencies or contradictions that
are not material to the asylum claim cannot, standing alone, support an
adverse credibility determination-the court regularly applied the test in
practice.64 For example, in Nreka v. U.S. Attorney General, the court
held that an asylum seeker's use of a false passport to enter the United
States would not support an adverse credibility finding, citing the dis-
tinction between false statements that involve the heart of the asylum
claim (which affect credibility) and those that are incidental to the claim
60. Id. at 817-18.
61. Mazariegos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1323 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Forgue v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11 th Cir. 2005); Yang
v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (credibility is a question of fact for the
immigration judge, and the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the IJ).
62. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000) ("[Aldministrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary .... ).
63. The REAL ID Act abrogates the "heart of the claim" test by providing that immigration
judges may consider inconsistencies, inaccuracies or falsehoods without regard to whether they go
to the heart of the applicant's claim, applying a "totality of the circumstances" test instead, as
discussed in Part IV. See, e.g., Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2008) (REAL ID
Act abrogates "heart of the claim" test); Lin v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (REAL
ID Act supersedes circuit's "heart of the claim" test).
64. Most other courts expressly adopted and applied the test. See, e.g., Stroni v. Gonzales,
454 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir. 2006); Leia v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 436 (3d Cir. 2005); Capric v.
Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1090 (7th Cir. 2004); Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 619 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2004); Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 796 (8th Cir. 2004); Korniejew v. Ashcroft, 371
F.3d 377, 383-84 (7th Cir. 2004); Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004); Ymeri v.
Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2004); Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660
(9th Cir. 2003); Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2003); Uwase v. Ashcroft,
349 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 2003); Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).
These courts continue to apply the "heart of the claim" test to their review of applications
filed before the Act's effective date, May 11, 2005. See, e.g., Kaita v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 522 F.3d
288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008).
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(which do not).65  The court ultimately affirmed the denial of asylum
based on the applicant's lack of credibility on "key elements of the
claim, and Nreka's failure to rebut these with sufficient corroborating
evidence and explanation. 66 Following Nreka, the court continued to
apply the test in practice in a series of unpublished opinions.67
The Eleventh Circuit has also followed other courts of appeals to
insist that dispositive adverse credibility determinations be expressly
made on the record, because otherwise "the reviewing Court is left in the
dark. '68 Thus, absent an express adverse credibility determination, an
IJ's conclusory reference to an applicant's claim as a "ridiculous
fabrication," or blanket description of her testimony as "extremely
inconsistent and [making] ... no sense whatsoever," does not constitute
an explicit (and thus sufficient) finding to be dispositive of the appli-
cant's claim.69 Rather, "IJ's must make clean determinations of credi-
bility." 7° Where the IJ has failed to make an express adverse credibility
determination, the Eleventh Circuit accepts the testimony as true.71
Moreover, like other courts, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized
that, unlike other types of credibility findings such as those made by
juries in civil or criminal trials, a credibility determination by an immi-
gration judge is subject to judicial review, and therefore must be review-
65. 408 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 2005).
66. Id. at 1369.
67. See Vasiliy v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 07-12476, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 11572, at *7-9
(May 28, 2008) (declining to address whether "heart of the claim" test applies because adverse
credibility determination was based on inconsistencies that related to the heart of the applicant's
claim); Paniagua v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 07-13044, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5166, at *4-5 (11th
Cir. Mar. 7, 2008) (affirming adverse credibility determination where inconsistencies were
material to claim); Bertrand v. U.S. Att'y Gen, No. 07-13485, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 1613, at *7
(11 th Cir. Jan. 24, 2008) ("Although minor inconsistencies that are immaterial will not support an
adverse credibility finding, inconsistencies about material matters will."); Melo-Saganome v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 227 F. App'x 809, 816 n.7 (11 th Cir. 2007) (declining to address whether "heart of the
claim" test applied because IJ based his adverse credibility finding on discrepancies related to the
"major incident" on which claim was based); Drejaj v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 192 F. App'x 847, 855 n.4
(11 th Cir. 2006) (declining to adopt test but finding that inconsistencies were material to claim);
Medina v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 188 F. App'x 807, 808-09 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (applying "heart of the
claim" test); Valderrama v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 180 F. App'x 122, 125-26 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2006)
(declining to adopt test but finding that inconsistencies were material to claim); Thamsir v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 167 F. App'x 788, 790 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (applying "heart of the claim" test).
The author is unaware of any Eleventh Circuit case-published or otherwise-where the
court has affirmed a dispositive adverse credibility determination based on matters that did not go
to the heart of the claim.
68. Yang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("We agree with our sister
Courts that when an IJ 'says not that [s]he believes the asylum seeker or [that] [s]he disbelieves
her... the reviewing Court is left in the dark.' ") (quoting lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 534 (7th
Cir. 2005)) (alterations in original).
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See, e.g., Mejia v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 498 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.2, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007).
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able.72 The immigration judge therefore may not simply rely on a "gut
feeling" to disbelieve the applicant and deny his claim. Rather, the IJ
"must offer specific, cogent reasons for an adverse credibility finding, 73
which are supported by substantial evidence in the record." As with
other aspects of the asylum determination, the IJ must "announce [his or
her] decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive
that [he or she] has heard and thought and not merely reacted. 75 In at
least one unpublished case, Juliao v. U.S. Attorney General, the Elev-
enth Circuit expressly remanded the matter for a reviewable credibility
determination, requiring the IJ to make "explicit, considered and
detailed findings" as to whether the petitioner's testimony was credible,
and if not credible, to specify "what testimony was not credible (all or
what portions) and explicit findings why."7 6
Yet, when it comes to actually reviewing the merits of an adverse
credibility determination, the Eleventh Circuit has taken an exception-
ally narrow view of its role and the applicable standard of review.
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has never expressly reversed an adverse
credibility determination in a published opinion.77 It has the dubious
72. See, e.g., Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 22 (lst Cir. 2007) ("Although the
fact-finder on the scene has the advantage as to demeanor evidence, judges are expected-unlike
juries-to give reasons for their conclusions even on credibility.") (citation omitted).
73. Forgue v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005).
74. Id. at 1286-87.
75. Tan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369, 1374 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
76. 209 F. App'x 955, 957 (11th Cir. 2006).
77. Perhaps the closest the Eleventh Circuit has come to reversing a credibility determination
in a published opinion is Mezvrishvili v. U.S. Attorney General, 467 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 2006).
In Mezvrishvili, the immigration judge found that the petitioner had "credibly testified to instances
of abuse on account of his belief as a Jehovah's Witness, but ... found that Mezvrishvili lacked
adequate knowledge about or commitment to that faith and denied Mezvrishvili's application for
asylum." Id. at 1294. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit did not frame the issue as a challenge to the
IJ's credibility finding regarding Mezvrishvili's faith. Rather, the court characterized the case as
one where the conclusion as to Mezvrishvili's religion was not supported by evidence in the
record. The court remanded after concluding that both "the BIA and the Immigration Judge failed
to render a reasoned decision in consideration of Mezvrishvili's credible testimony." Id. at 1297.
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar issue in Tan, 446 F.3d at 1371. There, the IJ found the
applicant's testimony that she had been attacked by men yelling ethnic slurs credible, but, without
logical explanation, remained unconvinced that the attack was on account of a protected ground
(race) as is required for purposes of asylum. The court reversed, reasoning that the IJ's conclusion
was not consistent with the favorable credibility finding. In neither case, however, did the court
actually reverse an adverse credibility finding.
To date, the author has been able to locate only two reported, unpublished opinions where the
Eleventh Circuit has expressly reversed an adverse credibility determination in the asylum
context. In Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General, an asylum seeker from China claimed past
persecution on account of his practicing Falun Gong. 171 F. App'x 799, 800 (11 th Cir. 2006).
The IJ denied the claim based on an adverse credibility determination, including the I's belief
that the applicant was not in fact a Falun Gong practitioner. The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
finding that the supposed "inconsistencies" and "other weaknesses" relied on by the IJ to make an
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distinction of being the only circuit court never to have done so (with the
possible exception of the D.C. Circuit, which does not typically hear
asylum appeals), even when applying the same standards of review as
other courts.78
adverse credibility finding were not "sufficiently explained by the record" and that the IJ offered
no specific or cogent reasons for disbelieving the explanations. Id. The court rejected the U's
reliance on his own experiences in other Falun Gong cases rather than the record in this case,
particularly since the IJ's stated experiences were contradicted by the record. The court also
criticized the IJ, who opined that petitioner's knowledge about Falun Gong was "as instructive as
opening a fortune cookie" and "quite off-the-wall," for disbelieving that the petitioner was a Falun
Gong practitioner based solely on his own experience or personal beliefs. Id. at 806.
In Louis v. U.S. Attorney General, the IJ had found the applicant not to be credible based on a
lack of detail in his asylum application about two arrests to which he later testified, and on
perceived inconsistencies between his application and later testimony. 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
7434 (1 1th Cir. Apr. 11, 2008). The BIA affirmed the adverse credibility finding, adding that
Louis had purportedly failed to mention the arrests in his asylum application. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that in fact Louis had mentioned his arrests in the asylum application,
that the only difference arose from Louis's providing greater detail in his testimony, that the IJ
erred by failing to afford Louis an opportunity to explain the perceived inconsistencies, and that
on appeal Louis was able to explain how there was no inconsistency by reference to evidence in
the record.
78. Every other U.S. court of appeals has found occasion to reverse an adverse credibility
determination in a published opinion, and most courts have done so on several occasions. See,
e.g., Shahinaj v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 1027, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that the U's adverse
credibility determination was not supported by the record, where the IJ's finding was based on his
personal experience that the applicant did not dress, act, or speak like a homosexual); Alexandrov
v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing finding based on the IJ's personal
beliefs about how long beatings or detentions should last); Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 553
(7th Cir. 2006); Mwembie v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 405, 410-12 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
credibility determination where the IJ's findings were not supported by the record and were
instead based on pure speculation or conjecture, including the conclusions that the asylum seeker
would have taken time to say good-bye to her family before fleeing persecution, and that her
testimony about daily rapes while in detention was an "incomprehensible" and thus implausible
level of brutality; affirming on other grounds); Pavlova v. INS, 441 F.3d 82, 88-90 (2d Cir. 2006)
(reversing adverse finding where the IJ mischaracterized the substance of the applicant's
testimony, unreasonably found implausible the applicant's explanation for why she waited nearly
a year to apply for asylum, and relied on the applicant's imprecise use of medical terminology);
Pramatarov v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 764, 765 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The immigration judge ... doubted
the applicant's credibility on grounds that, because of factual error, bootless speculation, and
errors of logic, lack a rational basis."); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 89-91 (2d Cir. 2006);
Shah v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 429, 430 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that while no reasonable
person would have found the asylum applicant not credible, the U here in "his apparent zeal to
deny relief' found the asylum applicant not credible by ignoring strong documents regarding the
applicant's father's death and relying on weak support for his conclusion); Singh v. Gonzales, 439
F.3d 1100, 1106-10 (9th Cir. 2006); Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 539 (4th Cir. 2006)
(reversing adverse credibility determination where the IJ failed to provide specific, cogent reasons
for disbelieving the applicant's testimony as "implausible"); Yang v. BIA, 440 F.3d 72, 76 (2d
Cir. 2006); Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 995, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2006); Chaib v. Ashcroft, 397
F.3d 1273, 1278-80 (10th Cit. 2005) (reversing where the U relied on speculation regarding the
Algerian government's treatment of suspected terrorist supporters and speculation regarding the
Algerian bank's computer system without evidence in the record to support the IJ's conclusions);
Hot v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 2005); Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104,
115 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing the immigration judge's findings that were "grounded solely on
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There is no reason to believe that immigration judges within the
Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction are somehow immune from committing
reversible error in their credibility determinations, while immigration
judges in every other circuit in the country are not. Certainly, the same
troubling disparities in immigrant judging that have been observed
nationally are also present in this circuit. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit's
reluctance to reverse credibility determinations, and its refusal to do so
in any published opinion to date, suggests that the court has applied an
unduly narrow view of the standard of review.
Other courts have cautioned against construing the substantial evi-
dence test so stringently so as to render it meaningless. The Fourth Cir-
speculation and conjecture," including the conclusion that the birth certificate "appeared
fabricated" absent any evidence to support that conclusion); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272,
292 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing the IJ where stated bases for conclusions did not logically flow from
the facts considered, stating that "it is the IJ's conclusion, not [the petitioner's] testimony, that
'strains credulity'"); Latifi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing adverse
credibility determination where Albanian applicant's credible fear interview at airport was only
inconsistent with his testimony in trivial ways; the applicant offered explanation as to why he was
not more forthcoming in initial interview, and the IJ did not evaluate his explanation); Lin v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 404 (2d Cir. 2005); Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1116-18
(9th Cir. 2005); Me~e v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 562, 573-75 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing findings
where the IJ relied on the omission of one of many beatings from the asylum application,
inconsistencies that were not supported by the record, and misconstruction of the record); Quan v.
Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing where the IJ relied on minor
inconsistencies and speculation, but did not give the applicant an opportunity to clarify unclear
testimony); Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing where
"perceived contradictions" were based on a misconstruction of the record, insufficient evidence,
and improper speculation and conjecture); Tabaku v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 417, 422-23 (7th Cir.
2005); Bellido v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing adverse finding based on
an asylum application's omission of certain details of claim, and certain "implausibilities" cited by
the IJ that the reviewing court found not to be legitimate); Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143,
1153 (10th Cir. 2004) (reversing where the IJ "failed to substantiate his skepticism with any
record support"); Ge v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004); Lin v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d
748, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The IJ's skepticism-utterly unsupported by any facts in the
record-with respect to [one] detail of her story does not form a valid basis for a negative
credibility determination, in the face of the other corroborating information she presented.");
Mihaylov v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 15, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2004) (reversing adverse credibility
determination based on the I's belief that a Bulgarian asylum seeker was alcoholic, and finding
incredible the applicant's beliefs about his persecutor's motives, rather than evaluating the
evidence supporting those beliefs); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc);
Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 279 (3d Cir. 2002); Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157,
162-64 (3d Cir. 1998) (reversing credibility finding based on prior inconsistent statement made to
INS officials where the handwritten record of the statement might not be reliable, the statement
was not obtained for the purpose of an asylum claim, and BIA made assumptions about the
applicant's understanding of English that were not supported by the record); Cordero-Trejo v.
INS, 40 F.3d 482, 485 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing where "the 's extensive negative credibility
findings, [were] without foundation in the record"); Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.
1987) (reversing where the applicant's lie regarding his Mexican nationality was explained and
accepted as part of his fear of persecution claim, because applicant feared deportation to El
Salvador).
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cuit has observed that although the court's deference under this standard
is "broad, [it] is not absolute. '79  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has
stated that the standard, "[w]hile deferential . . . is not the functional
equivalent of no review at all."8 °
Of course, a "standard of review" that in practice is never met, is
tantamount to no standard of review at all. In Silva v. U.S. Attorney
General, Judge Carnes's dissent commented on that paradox in a related
context: the court's determination of whether certain facts compel a
finding of past persecution on account of a protected ground."'
Although the Silva case did not turn on a credibility finding, Judge
Carnes's observations are nevertheless instructive here. In response to
the majority's conclusion that death threats and an attempted shooting
during the time of petitioner's political activities did not compel a find-
ing of past persecution on account of a protected ground, Judge Carnes
wrote:
The majority opinion refers to the often-mentioned, but never
sighted, "rare case" in which the facts are so compelling that we will
reverse an immigration judge's finding that a petitioner has failed to
prove persecution on a protected ground. No published opinion of
this Court has ever found that rare case, and today's decision indi-
cates that such a case, like the fabled unicorn, exists only in our
imagination. 82
Since Silva, the Eleventh Circuit has found that the record com-
pelled a finding of past persecution in at least six published opinions.83
79. Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004).
80. Tabaku, 425 F.3d at 421.
81. 448 F.3d 1229, 1244-49 (1 lth Cir. 2006) (Cares, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1248-49.
83. See De Santamaria v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-16221, 2008 WL 1787731, at *1, *8 (11th
Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) (Record compelled a finding of past persecution where the petitioner was
"repeatedly threatened, twice physically attacked, terrorized by the torture and murder of a family
friend who refused to give information on her whereabouts, and finally, kidnapped and beaten
only to narrowly escape with her life by the intervention of the Colombian military." Record
compelled the conclusion that this mistreatment was on account of the petitioner's political
opinion where her "attackers made painfully clear that their motivation for their threats and
violence towards Santamaria was her support of the Colombian government and her work with
various democratic organizations."); Niftaliev v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11 th Cir.
2007) (cumulative effect of numerous beatings, arrests, searches, and interrogations, culminating
in a fifteen-day food-deprived detention, compelled a finding of past persecution); Mejia v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 498 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2007) (threats and attempted attacks over an
eighteen-month period, which culminated in an at-gunpoint attack and the breaking of petitioner's
nose, amounted to persecution as a matter of law, but the factual question of whether this was on
account of a protected ground was for the immigration judge to decide in the first instance);
Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1233-35 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (record compelled
conclusion that an attempted shooting by FARC was past persecution on account of political
opinion and activities); Delgado v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 861-62 (1 1th Cir. 2007)
(record of threatening phone calls, vandalism of car, and physical attacks amounted to
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The court's recent willingness to reverse conclusions regarding persecu-
tion may reflect a growing recognition that the inquiry is not strictly a
factual one (for example, determining whether substantial evidence sup-
ports the IJ's factual findings as to what mistreatment the asylum seeker
has experienced and whether that mistreatment was on account of a pro-
tected ground), but also involves legal questions where the court has a
broader interpretive role (for example, determining whether the facts,
taken cumulatively, meet the legal definition of persecution).
For now, however, we might say that in the Eleventh Circuit the
hypothetically reversible credibility determination-'"the often-men-
tioned, but never sighted, 'rare case' "8-has assumed the status of the
"fabled unicorn"85 in the court's asylum jurisprudence, existing only in
the court's imagination.8 6 The question that remains is, how will the
court approach credibility determinations in a post-REAL ID world?
IV. THE REAL ID ACT
The REAL ID Act, which articulates standards related to credibility
and corroboration, will present the Eleventh Circuit with new challenges
in its review of asylum decisions.8" How the court responds to those
challenges will have a tremendous impact on asylum seekers within its
jurisdiction.
In Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is a False
Promise, Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo argues that the REAL ID Act
amendments to asylum law largely codify existing case law in several
areas, including corroboration and credibility.88 The application of the
new law should therefore not have a major effect on asylum adjudica-
persecution, and compelled finding that this was on account of political opinion even though
petitioner could not identify his attackers); Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 766 (1 1th Cir. 2007)
("[T]he BIA erred when it found that the cumulative effect of the beatings, the threatening phone
calls, and the kidnaping did not amount to persecution. The record compels the conclusion that
these events cumulatively amount to past persecution, and that this persecution was on account of
[petitioner's] political opinion.").
84. Silva, 448 F.3d at 1248 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1249.
86. See id. at 1248-49.
87. The REAL ID Act's amendments to the immigration laws were purportedly designed to
prevent terrorists from entering the United States or from obtaining relief from removal, but their
reach into asylum law could adversely affect bona fide asylum seekers. Section 101 of the Act,
which addresses credibility determinations and judicial standards of review for all asylum seekers,
is titled "Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Relief from Removal," and falls within Title I of
the Act, which is titled "Amendments to Federal Laws To Protect Against Terrorist Entry." Id.
§ 101, 119 Stat. at 302. Other sections of the REAL ID Act did specifically create grounds of
inadmissibility and removability for terrorists. See, e.g., id. §§ 103, 105, 119 Stat. at 306-09.
88. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is a
False Promise, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 101, 115-16 (2006).
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tions or how they are reviewed. Cianciarulo cautions, however, that the
"careless" drafting of certain provisions could lead to unnecessarily
stringent interpretations that adversely impact the asylum system by
denying protection to those who are eligible for it.89 She urges adjudica-
tors to interpret and apply the provisions in a manner consistent with the
case law from which the provisions were derived and with the humanita-
rian purpose of asylum law. 90
As with other courts, the Eleventh Circuit has not yet had much
opportunity to interpret and apply the provisions of the REAL ID Act as
they affect asylum adjudications. 91 This is because claims filed after the
law's effective date, May 11, 2005, are only now beginning to reach the
court after an initial determination by the immigration judge and admin-
istrative review by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
A. Credibility
While statutory law had previously been silent on the standard IJs
should apply when making credibility determinations, the REAL ID Act
has now announced a "totality of the circumstances" test. This test pro-
vides that credibility determinations must be based on both considera-
tion of "the totality of the circumstances" and "all relevant factors," and
may take into account, among other things, "any inaccuracies or false-
hoods ...without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's claim." '92 The Act states:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,
a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent
plausibility of the applicant's or witness's account, the consistency
between the applicant's or witness's written and oral statements
(whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the
circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such state-
ments with other evidence of record (including the reports of the
Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or
falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsis-
89. Id. at 105 ("Improper interpretation of the Real ID Act's language may have devastating
consequences for bona fide asylum applicants while providing no additional protection against
fraudulent claims."); see also id. at 116-36 (discussing interpretations of the REAL ID Act in
light of "careless" drafting).
90. Id. at 106 ("[A]sylum adjudicators have a duty to interpret the Real ID Act in the spirit of
humanitarian treaties and laws upon which the asylum system is based.").
91. See, e.g., Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that this case is
the first time the circuit has applied the REAL ID Act's credibility standard); Lin v. Mukasey, 521
F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying REAL ID Act standard).
92. § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. at 303.
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tency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant's
claim, or any other relevant factor. There is no presumption of credi-
bility, however, if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly
made, the applicant or witness shall have a rebuttable presumption of
credibility on appeal.93
Although the standard expressly states that adjudicators may con-
sider matters not going to the heart of the claim, it does not authorize
adverse credibility determinations based solely on minor inconsistencies,
omissions, or contradictions. Rather, the standard requires that the adju-
dicator consider any inconsistencies, contradictions, or fabrications in
light of the "totality of the circumstances."94  As Cianciarulo has
observed,
[The credibility] provision of the Real ID Act... is not a license
to base a negative credibility finding in whole or in any significant
part upon inconsistencies regarding immaterial facts. It merely per-
mits immaterial inconsistencies to be considered as part of the totality
of the circumstances. This is clear because the conference committee
expressly rejected language in the House of Representatives version
of the bill that would have allowed adjudicators to dispense with a
reasoned totality of the circumstances analysis and make negative
credibility determinations based on "any such factor, including ...
any inaccuracies or falsehoods .. .without regard to whether an
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the appli-
cant's claim."
Therefore, the Real ID Act specifies that immaterial discrepan-
cies should be factored in, but conclusively denies them controlling
weight.95
Indeed, the Conference Report for the Real ID Act states that credibility
determinations under the new law must still be "reasonable" and "take
into consideration the individual circumstances" of the applicant. 96
Moreover, it is worth noting that although under the REAL ID Act
an immigration judge's determination whether an asylum seeker's testi-
mony is credible continues to be a question of fact to be reviewed under
the "substantial evidence" test, the court's statutory interpretation of the
"totality of the circumstances" test is a legal question to be considered
de novo.97 The court's evaluation of whether a particular set of facts
93. Id. Other provisions apply the identical standard to individuals seeking any other relief
from removal or withholding of removal. Id. § 101(c)-(d), 119 Stat. 303-05.
94. Id. § 101(a)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. at 303.
95. Cianciarulo, supra note 88, at 135 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted).
96. H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 167 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 292.
97. See, e.g., Yang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 418 F.3d 1198, 1201 (1lth Cir. 2005) (legal
determinations are reviewed de novo).
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satisfies the "totality of the circumstances" test will present a mixed
question of law and fact.98
Although the REAL ID Act does not define the "totality of the
circumstances" to be considered, relevant circumstances will include the
context in which discrepancies or inaccuracies were found, whether the
applicant brought the discrepancy to the attention of the adjudicator or
whether it was revealed through cross-examination, whether apparent
inconsistencies can be attributed to language difficulties or translation,
whether the applicant was represented by competent counsel, whether
the immigration judge allowed an opportunity to explain or clarify any
perceived inconsistencies, whether the applicant provided credible
explanations, whether the applicant suffered traumatic stress that affects
the ability to recall dates and events with consistency and precision,
whether cultural barriers affect perception and memory regarding time,
whether there is a reasonable basis to conclude that any inaccuracies or
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of the claim undermine the
applicant's credibility as to a well-founded fear of persecution, and
whether the immigration judge's conduct may have affected his or her
credibility assessment (for example, if the immigration judge was intem-
perate or abusive, or otherwise exhibited signs of bias, hostility, or other
predisposition to disbelieve the applicant during the hearing).
After all, the object of credibility assessments in the asylum context
is only to determine whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of
persecution on the basis of a protected ground. It is not a game of
"gotcha" where an insignificant detail that does not have any bearing on
the veracity of the applicant's fear should pass for a specific or cogent
basis for a dispositive adverse credibility finding. Indeed, it would
defeat the purpose of asylum and refugee law to interpret the credibility
determination provision in a way that would permit the denial of relief to
a bona fide asylum seeker simply because she failed to recall a detail,
misspoke on some occasion, confused dates concerning a traumatic
event, was mistranslated at some point in the process, or was under-
standably reluctant to disclose details of a harrowing experience, partic-
ularly in an initial application or interview. 99
98. See Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1192, 1194 (11 th Cir. 2004) (holding, in the context
of a Convention Against Torture claim, that the question whether particular facts amount to torture
is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring a legal conclusion); see also Jean-Pierre v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (1lth Cir. 2007).
99. See generally Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian and
Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135 (1993). Margulies argues that
incredibility, inconsistencies and implausibility are part and parcel of any survivor's story.
Comparing the contemporary story-telling of Haitians fleeing persecution to the stories of his own
parents, who survived the Holocaust, Margulies concludes that adverse credibility findings against
Haitian asylum seekers are often unwarranted, and result in the improper denial of their claims for
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The "totality of the circumstances" approach also suggests that
adverse credibility determinations should be reversed where they are
based on the selective consideration of evidence, for example, focusing
on a minor detail in the face of overwhelming evidence supporting the
applicant's credibility. Courts have regularly criticized the "selective"
consideration of evidence in credibility determinations as inconsistent
with the basic obligation to consider the record as a whole. For exam-
ple, in Hanaj v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that an "IJ can-
not selectively examine evidence in determining credibility, but must
present a reasoned analysis of the evidence as a whole."' ' ° In Shah v.
U.S. Attorney General, the Third Circuit wrote that "[a]lthough we don't
expect an Immigration Judge to search for ways to sustain an alien's
testimony, neither do we expect the judge to search for ways to under-
mine and belittle it. Nor do we expect a judge to selectively consider
evidence, ignoring that evidence that corroborates an alien's claims and
calls into question the conclusion the judge is attempting to reach."''
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test, the question before
the reviewing court becomes not merely whether a particular inconsis-
tency or inaccuracy itself is supported by the record, but rather whether
the ultimate adverse credibility determination is supported by substan-
tial evidence, considering the totality of the circumstances and all rele-
vant factors. In Chen v. U.S. Attorney General,02 the only published
opinion to date where the Eleventh Circuit has applied the REAL ID
credibility standard, 3 the court affirmed an adverse credibility find-
ing 04 based on the immigration judge's specific reference to ten incon-
sistencies in the record, including whether officials seized Falun Gong
materials from Chen's store when they arrested him, whether Chen
admitted practicing Falun Gong while he was in custody, and several
other discrepancies between his asylum application, credible fear inter-
protection. He writes that the lessons of the Holocaust should be instructive, including his
parents' admonition, as they recounted their experiences, that "No one would ever believe this if
they did not know it already to be true." Id. at 135.
100. 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2006).
101. 446 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
102. 463 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2006).
103. Id. at 1231 n.3 ("Because Chen's application for asylum and withholding of removal was
filed on July 12, 2005, the amendment effected by the REAL ID Act of 2005 applies in this
case."). A series of recent unpublished opinions have also applied the new law. See, e.g., Jian
Gao v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 07-13990, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7960, at *15-17 (11 th Cir. Apr. 9,
2008); Bushi v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-11632, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6120, at *5 n.2 (11 th Cir.
Mar. 21, 2008); Jian Chuan Xie v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 07-14272, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7236,
at *12-14 (11 th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008); Fssahaye v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 07-12275, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1594, at *4 n.1 (1 th Cir. Jan. 23, 2008); Cala v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 250 F. App'x 296, 299
n.3 (11th Cir. 2007); Ndi v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 229 F. App'x 877, 879 n.l (11th Cir. 2007).
104. Chen, 463 F.3d at 1233.
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view, and testimony. 10 5 The court noted that the IJ confronted Chen
about the inconsistencies, and found that he was "evasive" in response,
and did not provide satisfactory explanations. 10 6  The court rejected
Chen's arguments that the adverse credibility finding should be reversed
because the inconsistencies were trivial and immaterial, noting that
under the REAL ID Act amendments, the immigration judge was enti-
tled to rely on them, while considering the totality of the
circumstances. 107
A "totality of the circumstances" approach is not new to the Elev-
enth Circuit's asylum jurisprudence. The court has long endorsed a sim-
ilar approach to the substantial evidence test as applied to other aspects
of asylum claims, by requiring that determinations regarding eligibility
for asylum be based on the "record considered as a whole."'0 8 In addi-
tion, the court has recently adopted a cumulative analysis to determine
whether past mistreatment amounts to persecution as a matter of law.109
Notably, the standard of review the courts of appeals must apply to
credibility determinations has not changed. After the REAL ID Act,
credibility determinations must still be supported by "substantial evi-
dence," as demonstrated by the immigration judge's "specific, cogent
reasons" for an adverse credibility finding.' ° Again, Judge Carnes's
dissent in Silva1 ' is instructive, as it cautions against a deconstructive
approach to reviewing factual determinations in the asylum context. As
Judge Cames wrote:
In determining whether the facts and circumstances in any case com-
pel a conclusion, we ought to face up to the full force of them in their
entirety... [rather than employ a deconstructionist approach, which]
proceeds by disassembling the whole of the evidence and then
105. See id. at 1232-33.
106. Id. at 1232.
107. Id. at 1233; see also Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
statutory credibility standard still explicitly requires the fact-finder to consider "the totality of the
circumstances, and all relevant factors").
108. Antipova v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 392 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11 th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See, e.g., De Santamaria v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 06-16221, 2008 WL 1787731, at *7
(11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008) (stating that "these events, taken together, constitute extreme
mistreatment" in concluding that the record compels a finding of persecution); Niftaliev v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1217 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (finding that cumulative effect of numerous
beatings, arrests, searches, and interrogations, culminating in a fifteen-day food-deprived
detention, compelled a finding of past persecution); Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 766 (11 th
Cir. 2007) (adopting a "cumulative" legal analysis for the question of whether acts of
mistreatment amount to persecution).
110. Chen, 463 F.3d at 1231-32 (applying the REAL ID Act credibility standard and stating
that the immigration judge provided "specific, cogent reasons for the adverse credibility
determination").
111. 448 F.3d 1229 (11 th Cir. 2006).
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explaining why each part by itself is insufficiently compelling. This
is like a man who attempts to demonstrate that a bucket of water is
not really that by emptying it cup by cup, asserting as he goes along
that each cupful is not a full bucket's worth until, having emptied the
whole, he proclaims that there just wasn't a bucket of water there.' 12
In the analogous credibility context, the court will have to deter-
mine whether facts found by the IJ to bear adversely on credibility are
supported by substantial evidence (a factual question) and whether they
are sufficient to constitute an adverse credibility determination under the
totality of the circumstances test (mixed question of law and fact). The
court will have to guard against adverse determinations that rely on iso-
lated inconsistencies or contradictions in the record, when doing so flies
in the face of the record as a whole, or that otherwise fail to consider
inconsistencies or other potentially adverse findings in their complete
context.'13
B. Corroboration
Although the bulk of this article is devoted to credibility determina-
tions, the REAL ID Act also added statutory provisions related to cor-
roborating evidence, which largely codified existing case law. l"4
Credibility and corroboration are related concepts in asylum law, but
they are analytically distinct and merit separate consideration.
In Niftaliev v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit applied
the REAL ID Act's provision relating to judicial review of corroboration
determinations, and reaffirmed the principle that an applicant's testi-
mony, alone, may be sufficient to establish his burden in a withholding
of removal claim.' 15
Vyacheslav Niftaliev, a Ukrainian national, testified that he had
suffered severe mistreatment amounting to past persecution, but offered
no other evidence to corroborate his personal experiences. The IJ found
Niftaliev to be credible, but concluded that he had not met his burden of
proof because his testimony was not sufficiently detailed, and because
Niftaliev had offered no corroborating evidence.11 Before the Eleventh
Circuit, the government argued that the court could not reverse the
112. Id. at 1247-48 (Cames, J., dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 700 (7th Cir. 2006) (reversing adverse
credibility determination; "An [immigration judge] must analyze inconsistencies against the
backdrop of the whole record ... No such examination occurred here. ... ).
114. See, e.g., Toure v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006) (the Real ID Act
standard of review of corroboration determinations has not been altered from that created
previously by case law).
115. 504 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11 th Cir. 2007).
116. See id. at 1216.
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immigration judge's ruling on corroboration, based on a new provision
under the REAL ID Act.1 17 That provision states:
No court shall reverse a determination made by a trier of fact with
respect to the availability of corroborating evidence . . . unless the
court finds.., that a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude
that such corroborating evidence is unavailable. "
8
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. As a matter of law, the court held that
Niftaliev's testimony about beatings, arrests, imprisonment, and threat to
his life was sufficiently detailed to meet his burden of proof.11 9 There-
fore, the court reasoned, the availability of corroborating evidence was
immaterial, and the new provision irrelevant. 120  The court also con-
cluded it was unreasonable for the IJ to have required corroborating evi-
dence in this case, stating:
We are ... troubled by the notion of condemning the petitioner for
failing to obtain some sort of documentation from the same govern-
ment that persecuted and imprisoned him, concerning incidents that
occurred approximately ten years ago. 1
21
The REAL ID Act's provision governing whether an IJ may require
corroborating evidence will thus be subject to the sort of reasonableness
limitation that existed in BIA and other case law before the amend-
ments. 122 That provision states:
117. Id. Although Niftaliev filed his claim before the effective date of the REAL ID Act's
provisions governing immigration judge determinations (May 11, 2005), the Act's judicial review
provisions took effect immediately and governed the court's analysis of his claim. See id. at
1215-16.
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (Supp. V 2000).
119. 504 F.3d at 1217. While adverse credibility determinations are questions of fact, whether
an applicant's testimony is sufficiently specific or detailed to meet the burden of proof is a
question of law subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 104,
114 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he IJ's evaluation of Chen's testimony as 'scant of details' and 'lacking
specificity' was incorrect as a matter of law. '[Tiestimony is "too vague" if it doesn't identify
facts corresponding to each of the elements of one of the "refugee" categories of the immigration
statutes .... ') (citations omitted).
120. 504 F.3d at 1217 ("[Tjhis appeal does not concern whether corroborative evidence was
available. . . . [It] concerns whether or not the petitioner's credible testimony, in and of itself,
establishes his past persecution.").
121. Id.
122. In Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987), the BIA recognized
"the difficulties faced by many aliens in obtaining documentary or other corroborative evidence to
support their claims of persecution." The BIA then stated the standard that would be adopted in
future regulations: that "the alien's own testimony . . . can suffice where the testimony is
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the
basis for his fear." In the case of In re S-M-J-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997), the BIA held
that documentary corroboration of an applicant's experiences is not required unless (1) the
experiences were of the type reasonably subject to verification; (2) the documentation is the type
that would normally be created or available in the particular country; and (3) the corroborating
evidence is accessible to the alien. See id. at 726.
Other courts of appeals have also reversed the denial of asylum based on unreasonable
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The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the appli-
cant's burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies
the trier of fact that the applicant's testimony is credible, is persua-
sive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the
applicant is a refugee. In determining whether the applicant has met
the applicant's burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible testi-
mony along with other evidence of record. Where the trier of fact
determines that the applicant should provide evidence that cor-
roborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be pro-
vided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot
reasonably obtain the evidence.' 2 3
The reasonableness limitation continues to be applied by other courts as
well.12 4
V. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit faces new challenges and opportunities in its
review of adverse credibility determinations in a post-REAL ID world.
Given the centrality of these determinations to bona fide asylum claims,
the burdens on the country's immigration judges, and the limited admin-
istrative review process, it is now more critical than ever that the Elev-
enth Circuit identify unsupported and unreasonable adverse credibility
determinations to fulfill its role in guaranteeing this country's commit-
ment to protect refugees.
requirements for corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 311-13
(2d Cir. 2003) (vacating denial of asylum where, inter alia, "the IJ applied too stringent a standard
to his corroborating evidence," and thus the judge's demands were unreasonable); Georgis v.
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968-70 (7th Cir. 2003) (vacating the deportation order because the
immigration judge's demands for corroborating evidence were unreasonable, and Georgis did
submit corroborating evidence); Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 220-22 (3d Cir. 1998)
(vacating denial of withholding where judge's demands for corroboration were unreasonable in
light of the validity of applicant's testimony).
123. 8 U.S.C. § I158(b)(l)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 2005).
124. See, e.g., Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 998-99 (7th Cir. 2006); Toure v. U.S. Att'y
Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2006); Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 500-01 (7th Cir. 2005).
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